Transplantation is the preferred treatment for the most serious forms of kidney disease; deceased-donor and live-donor kidneys are the two sources for transplantation, and these sources are utilized via two di¤erent programs. One of these programs, a two-way kidney paired donation (KPD), involves two patient-donor couples, for each of whom a transplant from donor to intended recipient is not possible due to medical incompatibilities, but such that the patient in each couple could receive a transplant from the donor in the other couple. This pair of couples can then exchange donated kidneys. Another possibility is a list exchange (LE): a living incompatible donor provides a kidney to a candidate on the deceased-donor (DD) waitlist and in return the intended recipient of this donor receives a priority on the DD-waitlist. Recently, thanks to the contributions of the mechanism design literature, several kidney exchange mechanisms are developed. In this work, we explore how to organize such exchanges by integrating KPD and LE, and taking into consideration the fact that transplants from live donors have a higher chance of success than those from cadavers. The fairness implication of this distinction is that if the donor of an intended recipient donates to a patient in the patient-donor couples pool, then that intended recipient should have a priority in receiving live-donor kidney transplant. Our contribution is a new stochastic kidney exchange mechanism involving multiple-way KPD's and LE-chains based on e¢ ciency and egalitarianism.
Introduction
Transplantation is the preferred treatment for the most serious forms of kidney disease.
Unfortunately, there is a considerable shortage of deceased-donor kidneys: as of March 2, 2007 , there are 70,321 patients waiting for kidney transplants in the U.S., with the median waiting time of over 3 years, and in 2006, there were only 10,659 transplants of deceaseddonor kidneys. The cadaveric kidneys are not the only sources for transplantation. Since healthy people have two kidneys and can remain healthy on one, it is also possible for a kidney patient to receive a live-donor transplant. In 2006, there were 6,425 transplants of live-donor kidneys. These two sources of kidneys enable the medical authorities to develop and utilize di¤erent programs to increase the number of transplantations.
One of these programs is a kidney paired donation (KPD). A two-way KPD involves two patient-donor couples, for each of whom a transplant from donor to intended recipient is not possible due to medical incompatibilities, but such that the patient in each couple could receive a transplant from the donor in the other couple (Rapaport [29] , Ross et al. [30] ). This pair of couples can then exchange donated kidneys. Multiple-way exchanges, in which multiple pairs participate, can also be utilized. To expand the opportunity for KPD, optimal matching algorithms have been designed to identify maximal sets of compatible donor/recipient pairs from a registry of incompatible pairs. Another possibility is a list exchange (LE). In an LE-chain of length two, a living incompatible donor provides a kidney to a candidate on the deceased-donor (DD) waitlist and in return the intended recipient of this donor receives a priority on the DD-waitlist.
This improves the welfare of the patient in the couple, compared to having a long wait for a compatible cadaver kidney, and it bene…ts the recipient of the live kidney, and other on the DD-waitlist who bene…t from the increase in the kidney supply due to an additional living donor. Through April 2006, 24 list exchanges have been performed. LE-chains in which more than one additional pair participates can also be considered. An LE-chain with n pairs is depicted in Figure 1 where R w denotes the recipient on the waitlist.
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Priority on the DD-waitlist As the data shows, the gap between the patient survival rates increases over the years post transplant. The comparison between the graft survival rates is actually more striking. Our goal is to explore how to organize kidney exchange by integrating KPD and LE, and taking into consideration the distinction between the success rates of transplants from live donors and those from cadavers. Since, the incompatible patient-donor pairs register the centralized clearinghouse with the expectation of receiving a live-donor kidney transplant for the patient, 1 the fairness implication of this distinction is that if the donor of an intended recipient donates to a patient in the patient-donor couples pool, then that intended recipient should have a priority in receiving live-donor kidney transplant.
In random matchings, this wisdom is elevated to equating the di¤erence between the probability of a patient's receiving a live-donor kidney transplant and the probability of his donor's donating her kidney to someone in the patient-donor couples pool, as much as possible among all patient-donor couples in the pool. Our mechanism constructs multipleway KPD's and LE-chains based on e¢ ciency, and egalitarianism in the sense we have just de…ned.
While transplants from live donors have a higher chance of success than those from cadavers, the experience of American surgeons suggests that patients should be indi¤erent among kidneys from healthy donors that are blood type and immunologically compatible with the patient. This is because, in the US, transplants of compatible live kidneys have about equal graft survival probabilities, regardless of the closeness of tissue types between patient and donor (Gjertson and Cecka [20] and Delmonico [10] ). In accordance with this medical …ndings, we assume that while patients'preferences over the set of live-donor kidneys are such 0-1 preferences (following Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8] , we refer to such preferences as dichotomous), they prefer a live-donor kidney transplant to a cadaverickidney transplant.
Our work builds on the closely related paper by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8] . They considered two-sided matching such that an agent on one side of the market can only be matched with an agent on the other side, modelled as a bipartite graph, with dichotomous preferences. Kidney exchange can be interpreted as a special case of this matching problem, that is, as an assignment problem with donors being the resources to be allocated to the patients, and …nding an e¢ cient exchange in this model reduces to …nding the maximal cardinality matching in the corresponding bipartite graph. The maximum cardinality matching problem is well analyzed in the graph theory literature. More speci…cally, the Gallai [18, 19] -Edmonds [12] Decomposition Lemma characterizes the set of maximum cardinality matchings. We make use of this result in constructing an e¢ cient exchange.
In order to achieve egalitarianism, we need another elegant result from graph theory:
Gale's Theorem (Gale [17] , Schrijver [40] ).
Related Literature
While the transplantation community approved the use of KPD and LE programs to increase kidney donations, it has provided little guidance about how to organize such exchanges. Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver [35] suggested that, by modelling kidney exchange as a mechanism design problem, integrating KPD and LE may bene…t additional candidates. 2 This approach turns out to be very successful and is supported by the medical community.
Since then, a centralized mechanism for kidney exchange based on these two protocols has been used in the regional exchange program in New England (The United Network for
Organ Sharing-UNOS-Region 1). In terms of integrating KPD and LE programs, their paper is closest to the present work.
Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver [36] suggested an alternative mechanism which involves only two-way KPD's and no LE's, and assumes that each patient is indi¤erent between all compatible kidneys. They characterize the maximal cardinality matchings under the constraint that only pairwise exchanges be conducted. They show that, in the constrained problem, e¢ cient and strategy-proof mechanisms exist. These mechanisms include a deterministic mechanism based on the priority setting that organ banks currently use for the allocation of cadaver kidneys, and a stochastic mechanism based on elementary notions of justice. While Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8] considered two-sided matching such that an agent on one side of the market can only be matched with an agent on the other side, modelled as a bipartite graph, with dichotomous preferences, and characterized the egalitarian and e¢ cient (random) solution, the results of Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver [36] on the egalitarian mechanism generalize the corresponding results of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8] to general, not necessarily bipartite graphs. One of the crucial aspects of these two papers is …nding an e¢ cient matching which reduces to …nding a maximum cardinality matching in the corresponding graphs that derive from the dichotomous preferences of agents. The solution to this latter problem is the Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition Lemma [12, 18, 19] , and technical aspects of our contribution build on this result.
Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver [37] also explore that, when multiple-way KPD's are feasible, three-way KPD's as well as two-way KPD's will have a substantial e¤ect on the number of transplants that can be arranged, and larger than three-way KPD's have less impact on e¢ ciency.
We use the Lorenz dominance as the criterion for distributive justice as Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8] , and Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver [36] . Another work that uses the same criterion for an egalitarian allocation is by Dutta and Ray [11] . They show that, for convex cooperative games, the egalitarian allocation is unique and it is in the core.
The model
Let P be a …nite set of patients each of whom has an incompatible donor, and D be the set of these donors. We denote the donor of patient p 2 P Note that the set D p fully describes the preferences of patient p:
A kidney exchange problem, or simply a problem is a triple (P; D; (D p ) p2P ):
We refer to the triple (P; D; C) as the reduced problem of (P; D; (D p ) p2P ): Throughout the paper, we …x a problem (P; D; (D p ) p2P ); and the reduced problem (P; D; C) of
A deterministic matching is an injective partial function from P into D; that is, 
Let M denote the set of all individually rational deterministic matchings. 3 Let P fp 2 P : (p) 2 Dg; the set of patients matched by :
We call jP j as the cardinality of matching : Let = ( ) 2M be a lottery that is, a probability distribution over M: Let M denote the set of all lotteries. Each lottery 2 M induces a random matching (ma-
; where z p;d ( ) is the probability that patient p is matched to donor d; that is, the probability that selects a deterministic matching such that (p) = d: Thus, for each 2 M; the jP j jDj matrix Z( ) is substochastic, that is to say it is nonnegative and the sum of each row (each column) is at most 1. Let Z be a non-negative and substochastic matrix such that
The set of all such random matching matrices is denoted by Z:
For patient p 2 P; the aggregate probability that he receives a live-donor transplant, is the canonical utility representation of his preferences over random matchings. Thus, given a random matching Z 2 Z; the utility of patient p is de…ned as the sum of the entries in the p th row of Z :
and the utility pro…le is de…ned as the non-negative real vector u(Z) = (u p (Z)) p2P : We 3 Throughout the rest of the paper, we consider only individually rational matchings.
denote by U the set of all feasible utility pro…les. That is, U = fu(Z) : Z 2 Zg:
Given a random matching Z 2 Z; the probability that kidney of donor d is transplanted to someone in the exchange pool, t d (Z); is the sum of the entries in the d th column of Z :
and the transplantation probability pro…le is de…ned as the non-negative real vector t(Z) = (t dp (Z)) p2P :
A variant of the Birkho¤-von Neumann Theorem [4, 48] , implies that each substochastic matrix Z 2 Z obtains as a (in general not unique) lottery 2 M: 4 Since, for each patient, two lotteries resulting in the same random matching yield the same aggregate probability of receiving a live-donor transplant, we do not distinguish them. Thus, a random solution to (P; D; C) is a matrix Z 2 Z: Proposition 1 Let I be the sets of simultaneously matchable patients, i.e. I = fI P : 9 2 M such that I P g: Then, (P; I) is a matroid.
E¢ ciency
The following property follows immediately from the second property of matroids:
Lemma 1 For each pair of Pareto e¢ cient matchings ; 2 E; jP j = jP j :
4 The Birkho¤-von Neumann Theorem holds for bistochastic matrices. This result is generalized to substochastic matrices by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [7] . 5 This result is also stated by Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver [36] .
Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition
The Gallai-Edmonds decomposition (GED) of bipartite graphs, a well-known result in graph theory, further clari…es the structure of Pareto e¢ cient deterministic matchings. 6 Lemma 2 (Gallai-Edmonds decomposition) Given a reduced problem (P; D; C); there is a unique pair of partitions fP o ; P f ; P u g of P and fD u ; D f ; D o g of D such that:
(i) D u is only compatible with P o ; and D u is underdemanded by P o :
(ii) there is a full match between P f and D f ; that is, all patients in P f can be matched with all donors in D f :
(iii) P u is only compatible with D o ; and D o is overdemanded by P u :
Note in particular that jP o j < jD u j ; P f = D f ; and jP u j > jD o j : The GED Lemma As shown before, …nding a Pareto e¢ cient deterministic matching reduces to …nding a maximum cardinality matching. The GED Lemma characterizes the set of maximum cardinality matchings.
Lemma 3 A deterministic matching
M is Pareto e¢ cient if and only if exactly
In each Pareto e¢ cient matching, patients in P o are matched to donors in a proper subset of D u ; patients in a proper subset of P u are matched to donors in D o ; and there is a full match between P f and D f :
We now turn our attention to random matchings. A lottery is ex post e¢ cient if its support is a subset of the set of Pareto e¢ cient deterministic matchings, that is, if > 0 implies 2 E: A random matching Z is ex ante e¢ cient if there exists no other random matching Z 0 such that u(Z 0 ) u(Z) and for some p 2 P; u
We denote the set of ex ante e¢ cient random matchings by Z e : A utility pro…le u 2 U is e¢ cient if there exists no other utility pro…le v 2 U such that v u and for some p 2 P; v p > u p : We denote the set of e¢ cient utility pro…les by U e :
The GED Lemma is also key to the characterization of the e¢ cient utility pro…les.
Lemma 4 (i) A lottery is ex post e¢ cient if and only if, with probability one, it matches exactly jP o j + P f + jD o j patients.
(ii) A random matching is ex ante e¢ cient if and only if the sum of its entries is jP o j +
(iii) A random matching is ex ante e¢ cient if and only if
is bistochastic, and to (P u ; D o ) is column-stochastic.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we consider only e¢ cient matchings.
Stochastic Exchange
Given a random matching Z; and a patient p; the di¤erence between his utility and the probability that the kidney of his donor d p is transplanted to someone in the exchange pool (we call it as the u-t di¤erence for patient p) is important in the sense of fairness: if the donor d p donates her kidney to someone in the exchange pool, then it is plausible to think that patient p should have the priority in receiving a live-donor kidney transplantation in exchange for his donor's contribution to the pool. But, there may be several patients whose donors donate their kidneys to the pool, yet there are not enough compatible donors in the pool to donate their kidneys to these patients. Thus, for a random matching Z; the vector u(Z) t(Z) = (u p (Z) t dp (Z)) p2P ; is key to evaluating its fairness; equalizing the u-t di¤erences as much as possible is very plausible from an equity perspective. We use the Lorenz criterion as the partial ordering of the matchings. The Lorenz dominance is the following partial orderings of vectors in R jP j : v Lorenz dominates y if upon rearranging their jP j coordinates increasingly as v and y ; we have for each k = 1; : : : ; jP j :
A matching Z 2 Z e such that u(Z) t(Z) is Lorenz dominant in the set fu(Z 0 ) t(Z 0 ) :
Z 0 2 Z e g has a very strong claim to fairness within the set of e¢ cient matchings. It achieves the maximum over fu(Z 0 ) t(Z 0 ) : Z 0 2 Z e g of any collective welfare function averse to inequality in the sense of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. Also, it maximizes not only the leximin ordering but also any collective welfare function P P f (u p t p ) for each increasing and concave function f: (See Moulin [27] and Sen [41] for these results and more on Lorenz dominance.) This leads to the following de…nition.
Let P u;u denote the set of underdemanded patients whose donors are underdemanded, To convey the idea in our characterization result, let us consider the special case where P f = D f = ;; and P u;f;o = D u;f;o = ;; that is, each underdemanded patient has an underdemanded donor. For an overdemanded patient p; at each e¢ cient random matching Z 2 Z e ; the probability of both him receiving a live donor kidney and also his donor donating her kidney someone in the exchange pool is one, thus, u p (Z) t dp (Z) = 0:
For an underdemanded patient, on the other hand, the u-t di¤erence may be negative or positive. Also, for each Z 2 Z e ; P p2P (u p (Z) t dp (Z)) = 0: (Note that this equality holds for the general case as well.) Since an egalitarian random matching necessarily maximizes the leximin ordering of the u-t di¤erences vectors, …rst step in …nding such a matching is to …nd the maximum possible …rst coordinate of the vector upon rearranging their coordinates increasingly.
For each E D; de…ne P (E) fp 2 P : D p Eg as the set of patients whose compatible donors are in only E: Let S P u be a set of patients. Our goal is to …nd a random matching such that the u-t di¤erence for each patient in S is the same and as maximum as possible. For each F 0 such that fd p : p 2 Sg F 0 D u ; P (F 0 ) P o ; and each patient in P (F 0 ) receives a live-donor kidney transplantation with probability 1. By
Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition, at an e¢ cient random matching, the patients in S can receive at most jD S j live-donor kidney transplantations, and also, at best, their donors donate only to jP (F 0 )j jF 0 n fd p : p 2 Sgj patients in P o : Then, if the u-t di¤erence for each patient in S is the same, then its maximum possible value can not be greater than
Since, given F 0 ; this number is an upperbound, to …nd the maximum possible u-t di¤erence, we need to take the minimum of this function over all such sets. Let
But, the problem is that we don't know whether there is a match such that each donor in F n fd p : p 2 Sg donates to a patient in P (F ): It turns out that there is such a match and it follows from Hall's Theorem:
Hall' s Theorem: There exists a matching such that each donor in F n fd p : p 2 Sg donates to a patient in P (F ) if and only if
for each E F n fd p : p 2 Sg : jEj jfp 2 P (F ) : D p \ E 6 = ;gj :
Suppose there does not exist a matching such that each donor in F n fd p : p 2 Sg donates to a patient in P (F ): Then, by Hall's Theorem, there is a set E F n fd p : p 2 Sg such that
This is equivalent to
Consider now the set F nE: Note that P (F nE) = fp 2 P (F ) :
Thus,
Since F n E fd p : p 2 Sg; this contradicts with the de…nition of the set F: Thus, the maximum possible u-t di¤erence for each patient in S can be achieved by matching each donor in F n fd p : p 2 Sg to a patient in P (F ); and the donors in fd p : p 2 Sg to the remaining patients in P (F ):
Since f (S; F ) is an upperbound for the set S; and we need to take the minimum of this function over all subsets of P u ; we conclude that the maximum value of the …rst coordinate of the leximin ordering can not be greater than = min
The question is whether there exists a random matching such that the u-t di¤erence for each patient is at least : Our main result shows that if the value of this upperbound is negative, then there exists such a matching. In the egalitarian random matchings, the characterization of the minimum positive u-t di¤erence is slighlty di¤erent than the characterization of the minimum non-positive u-t di¤erence. We will come to this point later. First, we generalize our …ndings here and present a recursive construction of the egalitarian random matchings.
The Egalitarian Mechanism: Recursive Construction of the Egalitarian Random Matchings
First, the donors in D f are matched to the patients in P f ; such that they are fully matched to each other. Let P u;u 1 = P u;u ; P u;f;o 1
Step 1: For each S P u 1 ; F D u 1 ; de…ne a real-valued function f 1 through f 1 (S; F ) = jD S j jP o 1 (F )j jSj + jF j jSj :
and S 1 ; and F 1 be the largest sets in the sense of inclusion 7 such that
Z e denote the set of all random matchings Z such that for each patient p 2 S 1 ; u p (Z) t dp (Z) = 1 0; and p 2 P n S 1 ; u p (Z) t dp (Z) > 1 :
Step k:
and S k ; and F k be the largest sets in the sense of inclusion such that
the set of all random matchings Z such that for each patient p 2 S k ; u p (Z) t dp (Z) = k 0; and
Let step K be such that K 0 and K+1 > 0: For each Z 2 Z K ; let P u;1 (Z)
Step K+1: For each T P u;u K+1 [ P u;1 K+1 ; and H D u K+1 ; de…ne a real-valued function 7 As we show in the Appendix, these largest sets are well de…ned.
) and T 1 ; and H 1 be the largest sets in the sense of inclusion such that
Let Z K+1 Z K denote the set of all random matchings Z such that for each patient p 2 T 1 ; u p (Z) t dp (Z) = 1 > 0; and p 2 P n
Step K+m: For each T P 
denote the set of all random matchings Z such that for each patient p 2 T m ; u p (Z) t dp (Z) = m > 0; and p 2 P n
Let M be such that at the end of step K + M; the construction is completed, that is
Main Result
At the end of step 1, each donor in F 1 n fd p : p 2 S 1 \ P u;u 1 g donates her kidney to someone in P o 1 (F 1 ) with probability 1. Each donor in D S 1 donates her kidney to someone in S 1 with probability 1. The next step continues with the remaining patients and donors.
But there is a change in the decomposition of the patients: Note that each donor in F 1 n fd p : p 2 S 1 \ P u;u 1 g donates her kidney in the current step with probability 1. Thus, in the next step, they are fully demanded or overdemanded donors of the underdemanded
Thus, each such patient switches from being a member of P u;u 1 to being a member of P u;f;o 2
:
At the end of step K, there is a matching such that the u-t di¤erence for each remaining patient is positive. Thus, to maximize the leximin ordering among the remaining patients, we now have to consider all the patients including the overdemanded patients. (In the previous steps, since e¢ ciency implies that the u-t di¤erence for each overdemanded patient is positive, we ignored them.)
At the end of step K+1, for each H D u K+1 ; the patients in fp :
donors. Thus, together with the patients in fp : d p 2 H \ D u;f;o K+1 g; they can receive at most
jT j + jHj donors. Also, e¢ ciency implies that their donors are matched to at least P o K+1 (H) patients. Thus, the upper bound for the lowest u-t di¤erence for the patients in fp :
Since H and T are arbitrarily chosen, to determine the upperbound for the lowest ut di¤erence, we need to consider each such pair of sets such that this upperbound as speci…ed above is the minimum. Thus, g 1 (T 1 ; H 1 ) is the upper bound for the value of the …rst coordinate of the leximin ordering for the remaining patients. As we show in the Appendix, there is actually a matching such that the …rst coordinate of the leximin ordering for the remaining patients is equal to g 1 (T 1 ; H 1 ):
Let Z 2 Z K+M denote a random matching constructed above.
Theorem 1
The random matching Z is egalitarian.
The proof of this result highly relies on an elegant result from graph theory: Gale's
Theorem. This result is relegated to the Appendix.
Concluding Remarks
Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver [35] proposed e¢ cient kidney exchange mechanisms that integrates the KPD and LE. Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver [36] later suggested an alternative mechanism which involves only two-ways KPD's and no LE's, and assumes that each patient is indi¤erent between all compatible kidneys. In addition to this latter assumption,
we also adopt the assumption that each patient prefers each compatible live-donor kidney to each deceased-donor kidney; and allow multiple-ways KPD's and as well as LE's as in the mechanism proposed by Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver [35] . Our contribution is to construct a stochastic kidney exchange mechanism that is e¢ cient and egalitarian. Although we consider only the kidney exchange problem, the same mechanism applies to the assignment problems with private endowments where the endowment of each agent is ranked at the bottom of his preference ordering, and there is an outside option that is always feasible.
Appendix
Directed Graphs and Gale' s Theorem
A directed graph, or digraph is a pair G = (V; A); consisting of a set of vertices V and a set of ordered pairs of vertices, A; called arcs. We say that a = (u; v) leaves u and
For each U V; an arc a = (x; y) is said to leave U if u 2 U and v 6 2 U: It is said to enter
Let s; t 2 V: A function f : A ! R is called a ‡ow from s to t; or an s t ‡ow, if
for each v 2 V n fs; tg:
Let k : A ! R + be a function which associates each arc a = (x; y) of G a nonnegative real number k(x; y) called the capacity of the arc. We say that f is under k (or subject to
It will be convenient to make an observation on general functions f : A ! R: Let P(V )
denote the collection of all subsets of V: For each f : A ! R; the excess function is the function excess f : P(V ) ! R de…ned by
Theorem 2 (Gale's Theorem) Let G = (V; A) be a digraph and let k : A ! R and
Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 5 Consider the …rst step of the egalitarian mechanism. 8 Suppose the sets
Then,
as well. 8 The result directly applies to steps 2,...,K as well.
Proof. For i = 1; 2; de…ne
Also, de…ne
and
By de…nition, we have n 1 + n 2 = n 3 + n 4 ; and jZ 1 j + jZ 2 j = jZ 3 j + jZ 4 j :
This is because, not only the compatible kidneys of the patients in By de…nition of P ( ); the patients in
Moreover, a patient who is neither in
Thus, the only double counted donors in the set
are the donors in
By de…nition of 1 ;
and thus,
Adding the …rst two lines and subtracting the third line
Since 1 is the minimum value of f 1 among all possible sets as de…ned in the solution,
Lemma 6 Consider Step K+1 of the egalitarian mechanism. 9 Suppose the sets
as well.
) : By de…nition, we have n 1 + n 2 = n 3 + n 4 : Also,
Moreover, a patient who is not in the latter set may be in
9 The result directly applies to steps K+2,...,K+M as well.
By applying the same technics as in the previous Lemma, we obtain
Thus, in the mechanism, the largest sets minimizing f k and g m in the sense of inclusion are well de…ned for each step k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg and K + m for m 2 f1; : : : ; M g:
First, we need to show that Z 2 Z e :
Lemma 7 The matrix constructed through the egalitarian mechanism is an e¢ cient random matching, that is, Z 2 Z e :
Proof. We prove by induction.
Step 1 : We claim that there exists a random matching Z 2 Z e such that, for each p 2 P; u p (Z) t dp (Z) 1 : We construct the following digraph G = (V; A) :
De…ne the capacity function k : A ! R + as follows:
De…ne b : V ! R as follows:
Let f : A ! R + be a ‡ow. Then, for
f (a) is the probability that patient p 0 receives kidney transplantation from donor d 0 : Sim-
is the probability that donor d 00 of patient p 00 donates her kidney to someone in the set P o : The function b is speci…ed to capture the e¢ ciency, that is, the Gallai-Edmond Decomposition. For p 2 P o ; since, by e¢ ciency, patient p receives a live donor transplantation with probability 1, b(p) = 1:
Also, for each p 2 P u;u ; the di¤erence between the ‡ow leaving vertex p and the ‡ow entering vertex p is the di¤erence between the probability that patient p receives a live donor kidney transplantation and the probability that his donor donates her kidney someone in the pool. Our claim is that it is possible to stochastically match the patients to the donors such that for each underdemanded patient, the u-t di¤erence is at least 1 : Thus, a function f : A ! R such that excess f = b; means that there is an ex ante e¢ cient random matching Z such that, for each p 2 P; u p (Z) t dp (Z) 1 : Thus, given the digraph G = (V; A); and the functions k : A ! R + ; and b : V ! R; constructed above, we need to show that there exists a b transshipment f satisfying 0 f k: By Gale's Theorem, there exists such a b transshipment f if and only if
First, note that the inequality is satis…ed for U = ftg: Suppose not. Then,
which implies
Consider P u;u [ P u;f;o ; and F 0 = D u;u [ D u;f;o : By the Gallai-Edmond Decomposition,
and this contradicts with (2).
Let S 0 = R 0 [ T 0 with R 0 P u;u and T 0 P u;f;o and consider a set U V such that
(1) is trivially satis…ed. Thus, we need to check inequality (1) only for U such that
we need to check it only for U such
We claim that it is enough to check inequality (1) for
Also, the construction of the capacity function k implies that k(
Thus, if inequality (1) is satis…ed for U n D 00 ; then it is satis…ed for U as well. Thus, it is enough to check inequality (1) for U where
which is equivalent to
This contradicts the de…nition of 1 :
Since U is arbitrarily chosen, this condition holds for each U: Then, by Gale's Theorem, there exists a b transshipment f satisfying 0 f k: Thus, there exists an ex ante e¢ cient random matching Z 2 Z e such that, for each p 2 P; u p (Z) t dp (Z) 1 : Let Z 1 be the set of all such ex ante e¢ cient random matchings.
Step k : Let the sets S k 1 ; and F k 1 be the largest sets in the sense of inclusion such that
The donors in F k 1 are matched only to the patients in P o k 1 (F k 1 ); and the donors
The donors in
D Sn \ D o are matched with probability 1.
The patients and donors in S k 1 [ F k 1 leave. Then, we construct the digraph with the remaining patients and donors, as in the previous step. By Gale's Theorem, there exists b transshipment f satisfying 0 f k: Thus, there exists an ex ante e¢ cient random matching Z 2 Z k 1 such that, for each remaining patient p; u p (Z) t dp (Z) k : Let Z k be the set of all such ex ante e¢ cient random matchings.
Step K + 1 : Let the sets S K ; and F K be the largest sets in the sense of inclusion such
The patients and donors in S K [ F K leave. If, among the remaining patients, there does exist an underdemanded patient p such that his donor has left at an earlier stage, then for each Z 2 Z K ; u p (Z) t dp (Z) 0: This contradicts the de…nition of K : Thus, the donor of an underdemanded patient p is among the remaining donors. We construct the digraph G = (V; A) where V is the set of remaining patients and donors together with the vertex
Let T 0 P u K+1 : By the same argument used in Step 1, it is enough to check the condition in Gale's Theorem for U V such that U \(D u;u K+1 nfd p : p 2 T 0 g) = ;: The de…nition of 1 implies that for each U V; b(U ) k( in (U )): Then, Gale's Theorem implies that there exists a b transshipment f satisfying 0 f k: Thus, there exists an ex ante e¢ cient random matching Z 2 Z K such that, for each remaining patient p; u p (Z) t dp (Z) 1 : Let Z K+1 be the set of all such ex ante e¢ cient random matchings.
Step u p (Z) t dp (Z) m : Let Z K+m be the set of all such ex ante e¢ cient random matchings. Thus, at the end of step K+M Z K+M is non-empty and contains only e¢ cient random matchings.
Lemma 8 For each k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g; k < k+1 : For each m 2 f1; : : : ; M 1g;
Proof. Let the sets S k ; F k ; and S k+1 ; F k+1 be the largest sets in the sense of inclusion such that k = f k (S k ; F k ); k+1 = f k+1 (S k+1 ; F k+1 ):
Now, consider S k [ S k+1 and F k [ F k+1 : Note that
Also, that F k ; and F k+1 are mutually exclusive implies
Then, combining (3), (4) and (5), we obtain
This contradicts with the de…nition of S k and F k ; that they are the largest sets in the sense of inclusion such that
Also, by construction 1 > 0; and K 0: By using the same inequalities/equalities as above, we see that, for each m 2 f1; : : : ; M 1g; m < m+1 :
For each patient p in S 1 ; u p (Z ) t dp (Z ) is the lowest under Z ; for each patient p in S 2 ; u p (Z ) t dp (Z ) is the lowest among the remaining patients under Z ; and so on. The only thing that remains to show is that, for each Z 2 Z e ; if p 2 S 1 such that u p (Z) t dp (Z) > u p (Z ) t dp (Z ); then there is another patient p 0 in S 1 such that u p 0 (Z) t d p 0 (Z) < u p 0 (Z ) t d p 0 (Z ): Note that S 1 P u ; F 1 D u such that fd p : p 2 S 1 g \ P u;u F 1 ; and
By compatibility, the patients in S 1 can be matched to at most jD S 1 \ D o j patients. Also, by e¢ ciency, the patients in P o (F 1 ) are matched to the donors in F 1 : At an e¢ cient random matching, the least possible number of patients who are matched to fd p : p 2 S 1 \ P u;u g is jP o (F 1 )j (jF 1 j jS 1 \ P u;u j); and this possible only if each donor in F 1 n (fd p : p 2 S 1 g \ D u;u ) is matched to a patient in P o (F 1 ) with probability 1. After this matching of the donors in F 1 n(fd p : p 2 S 1 g \ D u;u ) ; there are jP (F 1 )j (jF 1 j jS 1 \ P u;u j) remaining patients in P o (F 1 ); and by e¢ ciency each such patient is matched to the donors in fd p : p 2 S 1 \ P u;u g with probability one. Also, by e¢ ciency, the donor of each patient p 2 S 1 \ P u;f;o is matched with probability 1. Thus, for each Z 2 Z e ; X p2S 1 u p (Z) t dp (Z) We have already shown that there exists an ex ante e¢ cient random matching Z such that this upper bound is reached in an egalitarian way, thus, in a way such that for each patient p 2 S 1 ; u p (Z ) t dp (Z ) = 1 : Similarly, for the patients in S 2 ; the upper bound is reached in an egalitarian way, and so on. This completes the proof.
